South Canterbury Finance (SCF), once a prominent finance company in New Zealand’s South Island, collapsed in 2010, triggering a major financial crisis. The role of regulators in overseeing SCF and their effectiveness (or lack thereof) became a subject of intense scrutiny and public debate.
At the time of its collapse, SCF was regulated by the Securities Commission (later merged into the Financial Markets Authority, FMA). The Commission was responsible for ensuring SCF complied with securities laws, including accurate disclosure of financial information to investors. However, criticisms arose that the Commission was slow to respond to warning signs and lacked the resources and expertise to effectively monitor the company’s complex financial dealings.
One major point of contention was SCF’s lending practices. The company had a significant exposure to property development, a sector highly vulnerable to economic downturns. Regulators were aware of this concentration risk, but the extent to which they challenged or intervened in SCF’s lending decisions is a matter of ongoing discussion. Some argue that the regulatory framework at the time was inadequate for addressing the specific risks posed by non-bank deposit takers (NBDTs) like SCF.
Another crucial aspect of the regulatory environment involved the deposit guarantee scheme. While SCF depositors were initially covered by the scheme, the government’s initial commitment to honour all guarantees (subsequently capped) was perceived by some as creating a moral hazard. This perception could have encouraged investors to place funds with riskier NBDTs like SCF, knowing their investments were effectively underwritten by the taxpayer. Regulators arguably failed to adequately manage the risks associated with the guarantee scheme and communicate those risks effectively to the public.
Following the SCF collapse, significant changes were made to New Zealand’s regulatory framework. The FMA was established as a more proactive and interventionist regulator with broader powers. Regulations governing NBDTs were strengthened, including stricter capital adequacy requirements and enhanced reporting obligations. The deposit guarantee scheme was reformed to better manage risk and reduce moral hazard.
The South Canterbury Finance case serves as a stark reminder of the importance of effective financial regulation. It highlights the need for regulators to be proactive, well-resourced, and possess the expertise to understand complex financial instruments and business models. Furthermore, the case underscores the importance of clear communication to the public about the risks associated with investment and the limitations of deposit guarantee schemes. While the reforms implemented after the collapse aimed to prevent a similar event from occurring, ongoing vigilance and adaptation are crucial to ensuring the stability and integrity of New Zealand’s financial system.